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Court of Justice of the European Union
European Citizenship Rights in Internal Situations: 
An Ambiguous Revolution?
Decision of 8 March 2011, Case C-34/09 Gerardo Ruiz 
Zambrano v. Offi  ce national de l’emploi (ONEM)
Anja Lansbergen & Nina Miller*
On 8 March 2011 the Grand Chamber of the European Court of Justice delivered 
a landmark ruling granting a right of residence under European Union law to the 
third country national parent of a European citizen child who had yet to exercise 
his right of free movement within the Union. Th e decision in Ruiz Zambrano1 
opens the door for the acquisition of European citizenship rights (and, conse-
quently, secondary rights derived by third country nationals) in what have previ-
ously been considered ‘internal situations’ outwith the scope of Union law. 
Member states are thus prohibited from applying national immigration laws to a 
signifi cant group of third country nationals; a group comprised at the minimum 
of parent care-givers of minor nationals and potentially extending by analogy to 
family members of all nationals.
Th ough the implications of the judgment are potentially enormous, and despite 
condemnation of existing legal uncertainty in the application of the internal prin-
ciple to European citizenship provisions by Advocate-General Sharpston,2 the 
scope of the judgment and reasoning of the Court are frustratingly opaque. Th e 
following note will explore some of the questions arising out of the cursory judg-
ment in an attempt to probe the scope of the decision and its ramifi cations for the 
evolution of European citizenship. 
* University of Edinburgh School of Law. With thanks to Jo Shaw and Niamh Nic Shuibhne 
for comments on earlier drafts. 
1 ECJ 8 March 2011, Case C-34/09, Gerardo Ruiz Zambrano v. Offi  ce national de l’emploi 
(ONEM). 
2 Opinion of Advocate-General Sharpston 30 Sept. 2010, supra n. 1, para. 141.
Case Note
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The facts
Mr Ruiz Zambrano and his wife are both Columbian nationals. Th ey entered 
Belgium in 1999 along with their fi rst child on a visitor’s visa from Columbia. 
Shortly after their arrival Mr Ruiz Zambrano made an unsuccessful application 
for asylum, resulting in the issue of an order requiring him to leave the country. 
Th e order contained a non-refoulement clause stipulating that he was not to be 
repatriated to Columbia. 
Mr Ruiz Zambrano continued to reside with his family in Belgium, where he 
was registered with the relevant municipal authority. He made several unsuccess-
ful applications for a residency permit in an attempt to regularize his status in 
Belgium, and in 2001 commenced full time employment despite being ineligible 
under national law to receive a work permit. In 2003, whilst irregularly resident 
in Belgium, Mrs Ruiz Zambrano gave birth to the couple’s second child, followed 
by the birth of their third child in 2005. In accordance with Belgian national law 
both of these children acquired Belgian nationality at birth.3
Th e dispute in the proceedings before the referring tribunal concerns a claim 
made by Mr Ruiz Zambrano to receive unemployment benefi t in respect of two 
periods of time during which his employment was suspended. His success turns 
under national law upon whether he had a right of residence in Belgium during 
the period of time over which he was in employment and had made the necessary 
social security contributions. Th e main issue referred for determination by the 
European Court of Justice was whether Mr Ruiz Zambrano derived a right of 
residency in Belgium under Union law following the birth of his EU citizen chil-
dren in 2003 and 2005, notwithstanding that they had yet to exercise their right 
of free movement within the Union. 
3 At the time at which the children were born, Art. 10(1) of the Belgian Nationality Code 
granted Belgian nationality to ‘any child born in Belgium who, at any time before reaching the age 
of 18 or being declared of full age, would be stateless if he or she did not have Belgian nationality.’ 
Mr Ruiz Zambrano’s children fell within the scope of this provision by operation of the relevant 
Colombian legislation, which provided that children born outside the territory of Colombia do not 
acquire Colombian nationality unless an express declaration is made to that eff ect with the appro-
priate consular offi  cials. No such declaration was made in respect of Mr Ruiz Zambrano’s children 
(Sharpton, supra n. 2, n. 8). Th e Belgian Nationality Code has since been amended such that a child 
born in Belgium to non-Belgian nationals will not acquire Belgian nationality ‘if, by appropriate 
administrative action instituted with the diplomatic or consular authorities of the country of na-
tionality of the child’s parent(s), the child’s legal representative(s) can obtain a diff erent nationality 
for it’ (Sharpston, supra n. 2, paras. 16-17).
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Opinion of Advocate-General Sharpston
Advocate-General Sharpston identifi ed from the questions referred for preliminary 
reference three principal issues that fell to be determined by the Court: whether 
Article 20 and Article 21 TFEU could be invoked by Mr Ruiz Zambrano’s children 
notwithstanding that they had yet to exercise their right to free movement within 
the Union; whether Article 18 TFEU can be applied so as to resolve instances of 
‘reverse discrimination’; and whether EU fundamental rights can be relied upon 
independently of the exercise of a ‘classic’ Union right.4 
By way of a ‘prologue’, Advocate-General Sharpston fi rst determined that re-
fusal of a residence permit to Mr Ruiz Zambrano would constitute a breach of the 
EU fundamental right to family life, should subsequent consideration of any of 
the three alternative mechanisms succeed in establishing that Mr Ruiz Zambrano 
fell within the scope of European Union law.5 Turning then to consider the scope 
of application of Article 20 and 21 TFEU, Sharpston argued that the right of 
residence contained within Article 21 TFEU is a free-standing right that can be 
exercised in the absence of movement.6 Th is right, she considered, would be in-
fringed by a refusal of residency to the parent due to the inevitable consequence 
that the EU citizen children would be forced to leave the territory of the member 
state along with the parent. Moreover, Sharpston considered that even if the Court 
should fail to accept that the right of residence is a freestanding right, infringement 
of the child’s right to ‘move and reside’ within the territory of the Union neverthe-
less occurs by excluding from them the potential to exercise that right in the future, 
by analogy with the reasoning in Rottmann.7 Such a situation is not ‘purely inter-
nal’, but falls within the scope of EU law ‘by reason of its nature and its conse-
quences’; namely that it will for all intent and purpose cause the citizen to lose 
those rights conferred on them by the Treaties.
Turning to the second issue, Sharpston invited the Court to ‘deal openly with 
the issue of reverse discrimination’8 in order to resolve the legal uncertainty cre-
ated by the Court’s ‘generous interpretation’ of cross border movement and the 
‘random’ results that application of the requirement creates. In suggesting how 
the Court might clarify such uncertainty, Sharpston advocated three conditions 
that she considered would cumulatively establish clear boundaries regarding those 
circumstances in which ‘reverse discrimination’ would be prohibited under Article 
18 TFEU: that the situation of the static citizen is comparable in all other mate-
4 Sharpston, supra n. 2, paras. 50-52.
5 Sharpston, supra n. 2, para. 62.
6 Sharpston, supra n. 2, paras. 84-88 and 100-101.
7 ECJ 2 March 2010, Case C-135/08, Rottmann v. Freistaat Bayern; Sharpston, supra n. 2, paras. 
95-96.
8 Sharpston, supra n. 2, para. 139.
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rial respects to migrant citizens capable of invoking rights; the resulting reverse 
discrimination would entail violation of a fundamental right (defi ned in reference 
to case-law of the European Court of Human Rights); and the national law fails 
to provide adequate protection of that right. 
Sharpston proceeded to consider the role of fundamental rights in the Union 
legal order, arguing that the availability of such protection should be ‘dependent 
neither on whether a Treaty provision was directly applicable nor on whether 
secondary legislation had been enacted, but rather on the existence and scope of 
a material EU competence.’9 European fundamental rights should, she contended, 
protect the European citizen in all areas of Union competence (whether exclusive 
or shared), irrespective of whether that competence had yet to be exercised. Sharp-
ston however conceded that such a step could not be taken unilaterally by the 
Court, and that the fundamental right to family life under EU law could not cur-
rently be invoked as a free-standing right independently of any other link with 
EU law.10
Judgment of the Grand Chamber
In contrast to the detailed and comprehensive analysis of issues presented by 
Advocate-General Sharpston, the judgment of the Court is, to say the least, brief. 
Its operative part consists of ten short paragraphs. 
Th e Court fi rst made the preliminary observation that Directive 2004/38/EC 
applies only to those citizens ‘who move to or reside in a member state other than 
that of which they are a national’ and therefore does not apply to a situation such 
as that at issue.11
In turning to the substance of claim, the Court asserted that ‘Article 20 TFEU 
precludes national measures which have the eff ect of depriving citizens of the 
Union of the genuine enjoyment of the substance of the rights conferred by virtue 
of their status as citizens of the Union.’12 Refusal of a residency permit to the par-
ent of EU citizen children would, the Court considered, lead to a situation where 
the ‘those children, citizens of the Union, would have to leave the territory of the 
Union in order to accompany their parents.’13 Furthermore, refusal of a work 
permit to the parent would risk the parent not having ‘suffi  cient resources to 
provide for himself and his family, which would also result in the children, citizens 
of the Union, having to leave the territory of the Union.’14
 9 Sharpston, supra n. 2, para. 163.
10 Sharpston, supra n. 2, paras. 171-173.
11 ECJ, supra n. 1, para. 39.
12 ECJ, supra n. 1, paras. 42-44.
13 ECJ, supra n. 1, para. 44.
14 ECJ, supra n. 1, para. 44.
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Th e Court on these grounds concluded that Article 20 TFEU 
precludes a Member State from refusing a third country national upon whom his 
minor children, who are European Union citizens, are dependent, a right of residence 
in the Member State of residence and nationality of those children, and from refus-
ing to grant a work permit to that third country national, in so far as such decisions 
deprive those children of the genuine enjoyment of the substance of the rights at-
taching to the status of European Union citizen.15
Scope of the judgment
Unfortunately, the cursory judgment delivered by the Court raises many more 
questions than it answers. In eff ecting an apparently seismic shift in both the scope 
and content of citizenship rights without any exploration of the underlying prin-
ciples, any exposition of the specifi c grounds upon which it made the decision, or 
any other indications as to the reach of its implications, the value of the Court’s 
‘clarifi cation’ is dubious at best. Whilst one commentator has noted that the brev-
ity of the judgment means, ‘[o]n the positive side, [that] the case is very clear and 
there is no space for ambiguity’,16 others may feel that, by leaving unanswered 
many of those identifi ed by Advocate-General Sharpston, it simply muddies the 
waters. Some of the main questions arising from the Court’s decision will be ex-
plored below in order to explore the potential scope and eff ects of the ruling in 
Ruiz Zambrano. 
Substance of rights attaching to European citizenship
Th e potential scope of the decision in Ruiz Zambrano is defi ned essentially by 
those circumstances in which an individual is deprived of the ‘genuine enjoyment 
of the substance of the rights attaching to the status of European Union citizen’ 
and thereby falls within Union law. Traditionally, application of the ‘internal situ-
ation’ principle means that European citizenship rights are derived only upon 
cross-border movement throughout the Union. Th e decision in Ruiz Zambrano 
would seem to alter this position, suggesting that such rights can now be enforced 
against the home member state in the absence of movement. Whether Ruiz Zam-
brano will achieve this legacy turns upon an interpretation of the Court’s fi nding 
of deprivation of the substance of European citizenship; namely, what the Court 
15 ECJ, supra n. 1, para. 45.
16 E. Guild, ‘Th e Court of Justice of the European Union and Citizens of the Union: A Revolu-
tion Underway? Th e Zambrano judgment of 8 March 2011’, <eudo-citizenship.eu/citizenship-
news/453-the-court-of-justice-of-the-european-union-and-citizens-of-the-union-a-revolution-un
derway-the-zambrano-judgment-of-8-march-2011>, visited 22 March 2011.
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considered the nature of those substantive rights to be. Two alternative lines of 
reasoning presented by Advocate-General Sharpston point to diff ering interpreta-
tions of the Court’s decision in Ruiz Zambrano.
First, the substantive right possessed by Mr Ruiz Zambrano’s children, of which 
they would have been deprived by the refusal of residence to him, may have been 
a right to reside in the member state of which they are nationals. Th e right to 
reside under Article 20 and Article 21 TFEU is under this interpretation derived 
in the absence of a requirement for cross-border movement and is enforceable 
directly against the home member state. Th is seemed to be the favourable position 
adopted by Sharpston, who suggested that the right to reside ‘is a free-standing 
right, rather than a right that is linked by some legal umbilical cord to the right 
to move.’17 
In arriving at this conclusion Sharpston drew reference to the importance of 
fundamental rights within the Union legal order, emphasising the degree of sub-
tlety between existing case-law aff ording protection to fundamental rights in the 
absence of physical movement (specifi cally Garcia Avello), and the potential rec-
ognition of such rights simply by reason of residence in a member state.18 Th e 
‘paradoxical’ outcomes that result from such untenable distinctions led Sharpston 
to conclude that 
[if ] one insists on the premiss that physical movement to a Member State other than 
the Member State of nationality is required before residence rights as a citizen of the 
Union can be invoked, the result risks being both strange and illogical … Lottery 
rather than logic would seem to be governing the exercise of EU citizenship rights.19
Recognition by the Court in Ruiz Zambrano of a free-standing right of residence 
under Article 21 TFEU on the basis of the approach adopted by Sharpston would 
dictate that other citizenship rights could be equally invoked against the home 
member state in the absence of movement.20 Th e requisite link with Union law is 
under this analysis provided by the citizenship right itself, such that European 
citizenship provisions by their very nature fall outwith the ‘purely internal’ situa-
tion. Th is analysis of the Court’s decision in Ruiz Zambrano directly contradicts 
the oft-cited statement in Uecker and Jacquet that ‘citizenship of the Union, estab-
lished by Article 8 of the EC Treaty, is not intended to extend the scope ratione 
17 Sharpston, supra n. 2, para. 84.
18 Sharpston, supra n. 2, paras. 77-78 and 84.
19 Sharpston, supra n. 2, paras. 86-88.
20 Th e internal application of Art. 20(2)(b) was argued before the Court of Session in Scotland 
in an attempt to secure enfranchisement in respect of Scottish Parliamentary elections for a British 
national prisoner ([2011] CSOH 65, Opinion of Lord Tyre in the cause of George McGeogh 
<scotcourts.gov.uk/opinions/2011CSOH65.html> visited 8 April 2011)
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materiae of the Treaty also to internal situations which have no link with Com-
munity law.’21 Arguably, however, the continued veracity of this statement had 
already been called into question by the Court’s decision in Rottmann. 
Th e ECJ in Rottmann was required to determine whether withdrawal of mem-
ber state nationality fell within the scope of Union law by reason of the relationship 
between member state nationality and European citizenship. In determining that 
such issues did fall within the jurisdiction of the Court, the requisite link with 
Union law was established by virtue of the fact that loss of the nationality of a 
member state would in put the claimant ‘in a position capable of causing him to 
lose the status conferred by Article 17 EC and the rights attaching thereto falls, 
by reason of its nature and its consequences, within the ambit of European Union 
law.’22 
Arguably, then, it was in Rottmann that the Court had taken the determinative 
step of recognising the unique ‘nature’ of European citizenship rights as giving rise 
to the requisite link with Union law. Ruiz Zambrano simply applied to Article 21 
TFEU the principle that the Court had already established in the context of the 
right to hold the status of European citizenship contained within the former Ar-
ticle 17 EC. Th at this was the necessary consequence of the decision in Rottmann 
is however open to debate.23 If the Court in Ruiz Zambrano did intend to confi rm 
this principle, its signifi cance in eff ecting this change should not therefore be 
overlooked. 
Should future decisions of the Court confi rm that the eff ect of Ruiz Zambrano 
was to enable European citizenship rights to be relied upon in otherwise ‘purely 
internal situations’ the feasibility of retaining that principle in other areas of Un-
ion law is likely to be called into question. Th ough the extension of Union com-
petence into traditionally purely internal situations is likely to be limited by the 
unique character and function of citizenship rights, the legitimacy of retaining the 
principle in areas that could equally point to a pressing need for wider inclusion 
under Union law is far from certain. Th e eff ect of the decision in extending the 
21 ECJ 2 March 2101, Joined Cases C-64/96 and C-65/96, Land Nordrhein-Westfalen v. Kari 
Uecker and Vera Jacquet v. Land Nordrhein-Westfalen, para. 42.
22 ECJ, supra n. 7, para. 42. Commentators have debated the signifi cance attaching to Dr 
Rottman’s prior exercise of Treaty rights and his former nationality of a second member state in 
determining that the situation was not ‘purely internal’. Despite this having been the argument 
presented to the Court by Advocate-General Maduro, the judgment suggests that it was the threat-
ened loss of citizenship rather than the original nationality that brought the case within the scope 
of Union law (H.U. Jessurun d’Oliveira, ‘Decoupling Nationality and Union Citizenship?’, 7 Eu-
ropean Constitutional Law Review (2011) p. 138 at p. 141; G. René de Groot and A. Seling, ‘Th e 
Consequences of the Rottmann Judgment on Member State Autonomy – Th e European Court of 
Justice’s Avant-Gardism in Nationality Matters’, 7 European Constitutional Law Review (2011) 
p. 150 at p. 153; Sharpston, supra n. 2, para. 78).
23 For an alternative interpretation see text below between n. 25 and n. 27.
http://journals.cambridge.org Downloaded: 05 Aug 2013 IP address: 130.209.6.42
294 Anja Lansbergen & Nina Miller EuConst 7 (2011)
scope of Union law also reignites the well-rehearsed ‘kompetenz-kompetenz’ debate, 
calling into question the desirability of substantially re-defi ning the jurisdictional 
limits of Union law through unilateral action by the Court, particularly in the 
absence of any reasoned justifi cation for doing so.
Th e second possible interpretation of the Court’s decision in Ruiz Zambrano is 
more limited in its consequences. Th e substantive right of which Mr Ruiz Zam-
brano’s children were in danger of being deprived may have been the right to ‘move 
and reside’ throughout the Union in the future, rather than a self-standing right 
to reside in their home member state in the present. Th is interpretation draws 
support from arguments explored by Sharpston, and the narrow interpretation of 
the decision in Rottmann that she presents.24 
In outlining the issue of whether Mr Zambrano’s children can rely on their 
citizenship rights in an otherwise purely internal situation, Sharpston acknowl-
edges that the issue necessitates consideration of ‘whether Article 21 TFEU en-
compasses two independent rights – a right to move and a free-standing right to 
reside – or whether it merely confers a right to move (and then reside).’25 Th ough 
apparently preferring the former, Sharpston proceeds to off er an alternative argu-
ment that establishes the link with Union law even in the event that the scope of 
Article 21 TFEU is limited to the latter. 
Th is argument, which she constructs around a particular interpretation of 
Rottmann, is built upon looking to the future eff ects of deprivation of the rights 
attaching to European citizenship. In considering the grounds upon which the 
Court in Rottmann established the requisite link with EU law, Sharpston empha-
sises that ‘the judgment … looks exclusively to the future eff ects that withdrawal 
of German citizenship would have by rendering Dr Rottmann stateless.’26 Sharp-
ston thus presents an analysis of Rottmann in which the determinative link with 
Union law is not necessarily the nature of a self-standing citizenship right in the 
present (i.e., the right to possess the status of European citizenship), but may 
equally be supplied through the possibility of future deprivation of citizenship 
rights consequential upon losing this status. In doing so she subordinates the 
relevance of the Court’s reference in Rottmann of the ‘nature’ of citizenship to that 
of the ‘consequences’ of its deprivation, and subordinates the importance of the 
‘status’ of citizenship to the ‘rights attaching thereto.’ 
Sharpston invites the Court to apply this interpretation of Rottmann to the 
future exercise of the right to ‘move and reside’ throughout the Union in Ruiz 
Zambrano. Denial of a residency permit to Mr Zambrano would result in the 
children being forced to leave the territory of the Union, which Sharpston argues 
24 ECJ, supra n. 7; Sharpston, supra n. 2, paras. 78 and 93-97.
25 Sharpston, supra n. 2, para. 50 (emphasis in original).
26 Sharpston, supra n. 2, para. 78 (emphasis in original).
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‘would, in practical terms, place [them] in a ‘position capable of causing them to 
lose the status conferred [by their citizenship of the Union] and the rights attach-
ing thereto.’27 Th e ‘substance’ of the childrens’ right as European citizens in Ruiz 
Zambrano is under this analysis not a right of residence in the home member state, 
but rather the right of residency in a second member state upon movement 
throughout the Union. Th e children would be deprived of the potential to exercise 
this right were they forced to leave the territory of the Union along with their 
parent: a European citizen cannot move throughout the territory of the Union 
and reside in a second member state, if unable initially to reside within his home 
member state. 
Th is interpretation of Ruiz Zambrano (and that of Rottmann, upon which it 
relies) leaves open the possibility that the internal situation principle remains in-
tact in its application to citizenship rights. Th e requisite link with Union law is 
established not by the invocation of a citizenship right per se, but rather by the 
nature of the national measure in question as a conditional parameter for the future 
exercise of citizenship rights. Th is interpretation need not aff ect the traditional 
position that the acquisition of European citizenship rights under Union law is 
preconditioned by the requirement of movement. Rottmann and Ruiz Zambrano 
arguably align to carve out a unique protection of the potential to exercise citizen-
ship rights, such that the two sole and necessary conditions required for the future 
exercise of citizenship rights are brought within the scope of EU law: status and 
residency. Ruiz Zambrano under this analysis therefore both applies but also ex-
hausts the reasoning in Rottmann.
Th e Court gives little indication in its judgment as to the grounds on which 
its decision is based. Th e formulation of the operative part of the judgment in 
terms of deprivation of the ‘genuine enjoyment of the substance of the rights at-
taching to the status of European Union citizen’ mirrors closely that set out in 
Rottmann. Whilst both suggested interpretations of Ruiz Zambrano essentially 
draw legitimacy from diverging interpretations of Rottmann, Sharpston in her 
submissions to the Court made explicit reference to that case solely in relation to 
the children’s right to ‘move-and-reside’ in the future. In the absence of any other 
indications by the Court, it would thus be plausible to assume that in formulating 
the principle so as to mirror that in Rottmann it was the Court’s intention to adopt 
and apply the reasoning suggested by Sharpston in that regard. Such intention of 
the Court would preclude its recognition of self-standing citizenship rights: the 
‘future exercise’ reasoning would be redundant if Sharpston’s argument that citi-
zenship rights by their very nature fall within the scope of Union law had been 
accepted.
27 Sharpston, supra n. 2, para. 95.
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Th at the Court frames its decision with reference to Article 20 TFEU rather 
than Article 21 TFEU may also be explained by this intended analogy, the former 
being the post-Lisbon transposition of Article 17 EC and the provision under 
consideration in Rottmann. Th e Court’s reference in Ruiz Zambrano to Article 20 
TFEU therefore not only signifi es its reliance upon the reasoning in Rottmann 
(arguably reinforcing the analysis of that case presented by Sharpston), but 
moreover highlights that its decision is limited in application to the status and 
potential of European citizenship and does not extend so as to enable substantive 
citizenship rights to be invoked in the absence of movement.
In so far as both of the suggested interpretations secure residency for the fam-
ily member concerned the distinction is purely conceptual. Th e latter analysis 
however limits the scope of the judgment in respect of the protection of other 
citizenship rights in internal situations, and makes it decision easier to reconcile 
with persistence of the internal principle in other areas of Union law. 
Defi ning ‘deprivation’: residency for all non-EU national family members?
A second question left unanswered by the decision in Ruiz Zambrano concerns 
the scope of those family members to whom denial of residence would constitute 
a deprivation of the European citizen’s genuine enjoyment of the substance of his 
rights. Given the primacy that the Court has previously accorded to the right to 
family life in determining infringements of the right to move and reside,28 it would 
appear unlikely that future application of the principle in Ruiz Zambrano can 
legitimately be confi ned to the parent/child relationship on the grounds of 
physical dependency. It therefore seems probable that static EU citizens would, 
by reference to their fundamental right to a family life, be considered ‘unable to 
exercise the substance of the rights conferred on them by virtue of their status as 
citizens of the Union’ were their nuclear family members29 unable to derive a right 
of residence under Union law. 
Unfortunately, the question of whether a spouse can benefi t from a right of 
residence under EU law in otherwise internal situations was not defi nitively an-
28 Th us Carpenter highlighted ‘the importance of ensuring the protection of the family life of 
nationals of the Member States in order to eliminate obstacles to the exercise of the fundamental 
freedoms’ (ECJ 11 July 2002, Case C-60/00, Mary Carpenter v. Secretary of State for the Home De-
partment, paras. 38-39), whilst the Court in Metock observed that ‘if Union citizens were not al-
lowed to lead a normal family life in the host Member State, the exercise of the freedoms they are 
guaranteed by the Treaty would be seriously obstructed’ (ECJ 25 July 2008, Case C-127/08, Blaise 
Baheten Metock and Others v. Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform para. 63)
29 Case-law of the European Court of Justice suggests that defi nition of a family member is 
mostly limited to nuclear family members; see Sharpston, supra n. 2, para. 54.
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swered by the subsequent case of McCarthy,30 which called upon the Court to 
determine whether a European citizen had a right to be issued with a residence 
card by the member state of which she was a national notwithstanding that she 
had never exercised her right of free movement within the Union. 
Th e established motivation behind the European citizen’s application for a 
residency card in McCarthy was to derive a secondary right of residence under 
Union law for her spouse. Despite acknowledgment of this intention the Court 
was able, due to the national measure under consideration pertaining to the re-
fusal of a residency permit to the European citizen rather than to the third coun-
try national family member, to side-step the issue of family unifi cation by 
pointing to the European citizen’s unconditional right to reside in her home 
member state under general principles of Union law. Th e European citizen was, 
the Court held, consequently not ‘deprived of the genuine enjoyment of the sub-
stance’ of the rights attaching to Union citizenship by the decision to refuse her a 
residency card.31
Th e immediate eff ect of the decision in McCarthy is that the spouse is ineligible 
to receive a residence permit. However, in re-iterating the formulation in Ruiz 
Zambrano, the judgment leaves open the possibility that a decision to deport the 
spouse would nevertheless deprive the claimant of the substance of her rights as a 
European citizen. Given the fact that the Court chose not to engage with this issue 
when it could feasibly have done so, and that in this context it appears to be re-
treating from the somewhat controversial position in Ruiz Zambrano, it is possible 
that if called upon to determine defi nitely whether deportation of a spouse would 
constitute a deprivation of citizenship rights the answer (contrary to all indicative 
prior reasoning by the Court) may well be ‘no’.32
McCarthy in this sense provides an important indication of the way in which 
Ruiz Zambrano may be applied in the future. By fi nding that there is no ‘depriva-
tion of genuine enjoyment’ of the rights attaching to Union citizenship, the Court 
in McCarthy arguably strips the principle elaborated in Ruiz Zambrano of all 
content. An unconditional right to reside in one’s home member state under 
general principles of EU law was of course equally applicable to the European 
citizen children in Ruiz Zambrano, whose ‘deprivation’ stemmed not from insuf-
fi cient protection of their own residency status but that of their family member. 
Indeed, the same is true of any claim to residency applying against one’s home 
member state. By omitting in McCarthy to give consideration to the right to a 
30 ECJ 5 May 2011, Case C-434/09, Shirley McCarthy v. Secretary of State for the Home Depart-
ment; see P. van Elsuwege, ‘European Union Citizenship and the Purely Internal Rule Revisited’, 
7 EuConst (2011) p. 308-324.
31 ECJ, supra n. 21, para. 49.
32 It should be noted here that the judgment in McCarthy was a delivered by the Th ird Chamber 
of the European Court of Justice, whilst Ruiz Zambrano was decided by the Grand Chamber.
http://journals.cambridge.org Downloaded: 05 Aug 2013 IP address: 130.209.6.42
298 Anja Lansbergen & Nina Miller EuConst 7 (2011)
family life in determining an infringement (despite acknowledging the intention 
of the litigation in this regard), the Court has therefore eff ectively hollowed out 
from within the principle in so far as it applies to residency.33 Given that there are 
strong indications to suggest that Ruiz Zambrano does not extend beyond estab-
lishing a claim to residency,34 the result of the decision in McCarthy arguably both 
simultaneously purports to affi  rm the principle in Ruiz Zambrano and yet in es-
sence completely undermines it.
Defi ning ‘deprivation’: a right of access to labour market?
A third question concerning the scope of the judgment relates to the apparent 
statement by the Court that not only residence, but also an access to the labour 
market for the third country national family member is necessary for European 
citizen to be able to enjoy substance of her rights. Is a claim to residency still 
preconditioned by an, albeit reconceptualised, requirement of suffi  cient resources? 
Or is the eff ect of Ruiz Zambrano to secure an unconditional right of access to the 
labour market for family members of static European citizens?
Treatment of this issue throughout the case is ambiguous. Th e referring court 
implicitly accepts the application of the self-suffi  ciency requirement to a family 
member in Mr Ruiz Zambrano’s situation by asking whether Union law requires 
an exemption from holding a work permit to a non-EU national family member 
who otherwise ‘fulfi ls the condition of suffi  cient resources and the possession of 
sickness insurance by virtue of paid employment.’35 Discussion of the requirement 
of suffi  cient resources is notable in its absence from Sharpston’s otherwise com-
prehensive Opinion, and the Court refers to the issue solely in terms of whether 
Mr Ruiz Zambrano should be exempt from the requirement of a work permit, 
without clarifying the grounds on which this is relevant. 
Th ere are two possible interpretations of the Court’s decision that withholding 
a work permit to Mr Ruiz Zambrano would deprive his children of the enjoyment 
of the substance of their rights as European citizens. First, the decision could mean 
that the unique nature of the right invoked the European citizen as against their 
own member state (whether it be a free-standing right of residence in the member 
state of which they are a national or the future right to ‘move and reside’) means 
that a family member in Mr Ruiz Zambrano’s situation is free from the require-
ment of suffi  cient resources before being eligible for residency. Moreover, denial 
of an opportunity to acquire such resources in itself constitutes an infringement 
of an anterior and independent claim to residence possessed by the family member. 
33 For further comment on the limited interpretation in McCarthy of the ‘genuine enjoyment’ 
test established in Ruiz Zambrano see van Elsuwege, supra n. 30.
34 See text supra between n. 23 and n. 27.
35 ECJ, supra n. 1, para. 35.
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Under this interpretation suffi  cient resources are not a legal condition to be fulfi lled 
before the right is acquired, but rather constitute a practical requirement necessary 
for the right to be enjoyed. 
Such an interpretation diff erentiates family members of static EU citizens from 
those of migrant EU citizens, to whom the requirements in Directive 2004/38/
EC apply. It also is distinct from prior case-law in which, where the Directive has 
been inapplicable, a requirement of suffi  cient resources had nevertheless applied 
either by application of other legislation (Teixeira36) or as constitutive of the pri-
mary right on which the family member depends (Chen37). Th e extent to which 
such diff erentiation is a ‘paradoxical outcome’38 is limited by the unique nature 
of the primary right of the EU citizen as against their home member state, which 
does not substantiate the same need for a resource requirement. However, the 
preferential rights possessed by static citizens over migrant citizens may under this 
interpretation nevertheless be subject to challenge by way of a claim based in re-
versed ‘reverse discrimination’ under Article 18 TFEU.
Alternatively, the Court’s reference to ‘suffi  cient resources’ may be considered 
to apply as a requirement through analogy to Directive 2004/38/EC and prior 
case-law, as was assumed by the referring tribunal. If the Court did indeed intend 
to maintain the existence of this requirement, their judgment redefi nes it in such 
a way as to ensure that its application cannot preclude the acquisition of such 
resources through denial of a work permit. Th is interpretation of the Court’s treat-
ment of suffi  cient resources maintains consistency between the requirements 
imposed on family members of both migrant and static EU citizens, but for that 
very reason calls into question the current interpretation of the Directive as allow-
ing for the restriction of work permits to family members of EU citizens. 
It seems unlikely, however, that the intended eff ect of the decision in Ruiz 
Zambrano was to change the established defi nition of legislation not applicable to 
the facts at hand. Moreover, the Court’s statement that ‘if a work permit were not 
granted to such a person, he would risk not having suffi  cient resources to provide 
for himself and his family’39 strongly suggests that it intended to recognise a claim 
to the opportunity to acquire suffi  cient resources through acquisition of a work 
permit, which in the face of existing principles of Union law could be justifi ed 
36 ECJ 23 Feb. 2010, Case C-480/08, Maria Teixeira v. London Borough of Lambeth and Secre-
tary of State for the Home Department.
37 ECJ 19 Oct. 2004, Case C-200/02, Kunqian Catherine Zhu and Man Lavette Chen v. Secretary 
of State for the Home Department.
38 A. Wiesbrock, ‘Th e Zambrano Case: Relying on Union Citizenship Rights in “Internal Situ-
ations”’, <eudo-citizenship.eu/citizenship-news/449-the-zambrano-case-relying-on-union-citizen
ship-rights-in-internal-situations>, visited 22 March 2011
39 ECJ, supra n. 1, para. 44.
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only through reference to the exceptional nature of a claim against one’s own 
member state.
Although the unique nature of the claim against a home member state goes 
some way towards explaining this decision, when juxtaposed with the very recent 
expiry of transitory regimes applicable to A8 nationals it seems remarkable that 
the Court guaranteed access to the labour market to such a potentially large class 
of third country nationals in the absence of any justifi cations for or ramifi cations 
of their decision. Furthermore, that such restrictions remain in place in a major-
ity of member states as regards Bulgarian and Romanian nationals raises the ques-
tion of whether the Ruiz Zambrano principle will provide a means by which those 
transitory restrictions may be circumvented. Logic would require it to be so: the 
reasoning of both Advocate-General Sharpston and the Court applies equally to 
a European citizen parent in Mr Ruiz Zambrano’s position. Any future attempts 
to constrain the application of Ruiz Zambrano to non European national parents 
of European citizen children would be at risk of appearing somewhat contrived.
The interdependence of European and national citizenship: 
Tempering the effect of RUIZ ZAMBRANO ?
Th e consequence of the decision in Ruiz Zambrano is that parent care-givers (and 
potentially other nuclear family members) of static European citizens derive a right 
of residency under Union law irrespective of their eligibility under national im-
migration rules. Ruiz Zambrano thus seemingly extends to static European citizens 
that right secured for migrant European citizens by Metock, with the result that 
family members of static European citizens are equally subject to the disapplication 
of national immigration laws at their point of entry into the Union.40
In Ruiz Zambrano, as in Metock, member states had raised objections before 
the Court pertaining to the feasibility of managing a vast increase in the number 
of people eligible to a right of residence under Union law.41 Th e problem faced by 
national governments was not however simply one of volume, but rather also one 
of reduced competence in the highly politically sensitive area of immigration 
control. Th ough a member state’s authority over the control of its own borders 
40 ECJ 25 July 2008, Case C-127/08, Blaise Baheten Metock and Others v. Minister for Justice, 
Equality and Law Reform (see C. Costello, ‘Metock: Free Movement and “Normal Family Life” in 
the Union’, 46 Common Market Law Review (2009) p. 587; S. Currie, ‘Accelerated Justice or a Step 
too Far? Residence Rights of Non-EU Family Members and the Court’s Ruling in Metock’, 
34 European Law Review (2009) p. 310; A. Lansbergen, ‘Metock, Implementation of the Citizens’ 
Rights Directive and Lessons for EU Citizenship’, 31(3) Journal of Social Welfare and Family Law 
(2009) p. 285.
41 Sharpston, supra n. 2, paras. 105 and 114.
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was preceding Ruiz Zambrano by no means exclusive,42 the decision to grant Mr 
Zambrano a right of residency under Union law constitutes a highly signifi cant 
encroachment into an area previously outwith the scope of Union regulation.
Th e disapplication of national immigration law in any instance is, in a climate 
of fi nancial instability and increased euro-scepticism, likely to be met with a degree 
of hostility within national fora. Such hostility invariably increases when the re-
cipient of rights under Union law is (as in the case of Mr Zambrano) already ir-
regularly resident in the member state at the time at which those rights are derived. 
A perceived culpability attaching to the status of irregular migrant is seen by some 
to diminish the entitlement of an individual to rely on Union rights, reliance that 
is characterised by those of this opinion as a means by which to defeat the ends of 
the national legal order. In the wake of both Metock and Ruiz Zambrano such 
concerns have been expressed in political discourse in the language of ‘abuse’ of 
rights; a charge that is levelled against those perceived to be unmeritoriously tak-
ing advantage of European citizenship provisions in order to circumvent national 
immigration laws.43 Such perception within the domestic context is however at 
odds with the Court’s established approach that the motivation of an applicant in 
relying on his Union rights is not determinative of ‘abuse’, so long there exists 
‘eff ective and genuine’ fulfi lment of the relevant criteria.44
In this regard it is unsurprising that member states may attempt to limit the 
instances of perceived ‘abuse’ through control of those factors determinative of the 
acquisition of Union rights. As Sharpston highlights, it is within the discretion of 
member states to defi ne their rules on jus soli such as to ensure that a child born 
to irregular migrant parents does not acquire the national citizenship giving rise 
42 Whilst member states surrendered individual control over immigration policy through mem-
bership of the European Union, they have historically always held collective sovereignty over im-
migration in that third-country nationals would be subject to the immigration legislation of one of 
the member states. Th is position changed following Metock, though the consequences of this deci-
sion were limited in scale by its relevance only to family members of migrant European citizens.
43 See, e.g., questions posed by Dutch MP Van Nieuwenhuizen [Volkspartij voor Vrijheid en 
Democratie] (VVD) to G.B.M. Leers, Minister for Immigration and Asylum (unoffi  cial transla-
tion): ‘Do you share my opinion that the automatic grant of a residency permit to a foreigner on 
the basis that his or her minor child is born in a Member State can lead to the enormous growth in 
the number of residency permits that need to be issued and may lead to abuse of the system? ... Do 
you intend to take action to prevent the possible abuse of the decision [in Ruiz Zambrano]? If so, 
which? If not, why not?’, <www.rijksoverheid.nl/bestanden/documenten-en-publicaties/kamer-
stukken/2011/03/09/uitspraak-van-het-europees-hof-van-justitie-dat-een-in-europageboren-kind-
de-ouders-een-verblijfsrecht-geeft/uitspraak-van-het-europees-hof-van-justitie-dat-een-in-europa-
geboren-kind-de-ouders-een-verblijfsrecht-geeft-24833.pdf>, visited 3 June 2011.
44 ECJ 23 Sept. 2003, Case C-109/01, Secretary of State for the Home Department v. Hacene 
Akrich at paras. 55-57; see also S. Peers, ‘Free Movement, Immigration Control and Constitutional 
Confl ict’, 5 EuConst (2011) p. 173 at p. 178.
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to a right of residency under Union law for the parent.45 Indirect control by mem-
ber states over the acquisition of Union rights had already been evidenced in the 
wake of Chen, with amendment of the Irish Nationality and Citizenship Act 1956 
so as to preclude the acquisition of Irish nationality at birth to a child whose 
parents had not satisfi ed a minimum period of residency in Ireland.46 Ruiz Zam-
brano is likely to instigate a similar review of citizenship laws within member states, 
as evidenced by the amendment of the Belgian Nationality Code before the judg-
ment in Ruiz Zambrano was delivered.47
Member states’ control over national citizenship policy is not, however, absolute. 
First, the extent to which member states are able to restrict laws on jus soli is sub-
ject to their obligations both under international and European law regarding 
prevention against statelessness. Moreover, uncertainty persists following Rottmann 
as to the constraints imposed by Union law upon the acquisition and loss of 
member state nationality. Whether Rottmann requires all decisions pertaining to 
nationality to be considered in light of the ramifi cations for European citizenship 
remains unclear. Specifi cally, it is uncertain whether that decision encompasses 
acquisition of nationality in the event that the individual had not previously held 
the status of European citizen. Th ough the Court in Rottmann appears to preclude 
this possibility when distinguishing Kaur,48 Jessurun d’Oliveira notes that ‘[i]f one 
follows the Court’s line of thought to its logical conclusion, then every member 
state has to take EU law into account at the time of acquisition or loss of its na-
tionality, because Union citizenship systematically depends on it.’49 One conse-
quence of the decision in Ruiz Zambrano is that this issue is likely to receive renewed 
attention with regard to any action taken by member states to restrict access to 
European citizenship.
45 Sharpston, supra n. 2, para. 114.
46 Section 4 of the Irish Nationality and Citizenship Act 2004 provided that ‘a person born in 
the island of Ireland to Irish shall not be entitled to be an Irish citizen unless a parent of that person 
has, during the period of 4 years immediately preceding the person’s birth, been resident In the is-
land of Ireland for a period of not less than 3 years or periods the aggregate of which is not less than 
3 years.’ Th e amendments further provide that one of the child’s parents must be either an Irish or 
British citizen, or entitled to reside in Ireland or Northern Ireland without any restriction on the 
period of their residency (s.  3(d)).
47 Supra n. 3.
48 ECJ, supra n. 7, para. 49.
49 H.U. Jessurun d’Oliveira, ‘Decoupling Nationality and Union Citizenship?’, 7 European Con-
stitutional Law Review (2011) p. 138 at p. 147; see also G. René de Groot and A. Seling, ‘Th e 
Consequences of the Rottmann Judgment on Member State Autonomy – Th e European Court of 
Justice’s Avant-Gardism in Nationality Matters’, 7 European Constitutional Law Review (2011) 
p. 150 at p. 154: ‘Even though the Court diff erentiated between the situation in Rottmann and that 
in Kaur … it appears rather ill-founded to assume that situations in which the granting of Union 
citizenship is at stake do not fall within the scope of Union law.’
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Sharpston implicitly acknowledges the possibility that Ruiz Zambrano will 
encourage restrictive nationality policies, issuing a likely prescient warning against 
the ‘retrograde and reprehensible step’ of turning the European Union into ‘fortress 
Europe’.50 Th e irony of Ruiz Zambrano may be that, in extending the scope of 
citizenship rights through judicial activism and in the absence of member state 
support, the pioneering decision of the Court will undermine rather than enhance 
the development of European citizenship.
The elusive importance of fundamental rights
Th e Court in its decision in Ruiz Zambrano appears to be starting to realise its 
mantra that ‘European citizenship is destined to be the fundamental status of 
Member States’ nationals’,51 having imbued European citizenship with real mean-
ing for ‘static’ European citizens. Whilst enhanced rights for European citizens are 
promoted by Union institutions and on the whole are accepted and supported by 
member states, rights derived by third country nationals are often less palatable 
to many. Th e Court’s decision in Ruiz Zambrano, although ambiguous in its jus-
tifi cation, greatly widens the access of third-country national family members to 
rights under Union law.
Th e Court in Ruiz Zambrano restricts its discussion entirely to citizenship and, 
despite the right of Mr Ruiz Zambrano’s children to a family life being integral to 
the case, does not explain the role of fundamental rights in this respect. Advocate-
General Sharpston contrasts settled case-law on the application of fundamental 
rights against the ideal of consistent protection of fundamental rights wherever 
there is the ‘existence and scope of a material EU competence.’ Sharpston how-
ever neither expects nor advises the Court to eff ect such a change in this case, 
before the member states demonstrate the political intent to do so, but instead 
suggests that it refl ect on the evolution of the role of fundamental rights in the 
future.52 Th e context that Sharpston describes is of the coming into force of the 
Charter of Fundamental Rights and the future accession of the European Union 
to the European Convention of Human Rights, developments with regard to which 
it is fi tting that the Court demonstrate a more rigorous scrutiny of fundamental 
rights. Th e recent Test-Achats case53 is perhaps an illustration of this beginning to 
happen. 
50 Sharpston, supra n. 2, para. 115.
51 European Commission Justice, ‘EU Citizenship Report 2010 Dismantling the obstacles to 
EU citizens’ rights’, <www.ec.europa.eu/justice/policies/citizenship/docs/com_2010_603_en.pdf>, 
visited 30 April 2011. 
52 Sharpston, supra n. 2, para. 177.
53 ECJ 1 March 2011, Case C-236/09, Association belge des Consommateurs Test-Achats ASBL, 
Yann vanVugt, Charles Basselier v. Conseil des ministres. 
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Th e European Court of Justice has historically adopted a diverging approach 
to family unifi cation from that of the European Court of Human Rights, the 
jurisprudence of which allows for the right to a family life to be restricted to the 
extent that would be in accordance with law and necessary in a democratic soci-
ety. Th e scope of this restriction means that a balance is struck between the mem-
ber states’ right to control its borders and the individuals’ right to family life, the 
result of which is that the right to family life may be preserved if the family can 
unite in another country.54 Th e Court of Justice on the other hand has, over a 
number of cases (most notably Metock55 and Eind 56), widened the scope of fam-
ily unifi cation for European citizens by granting secondary rights to third country 
national family members where one of the fundamental freedoms are engaged.57 
Union law thus off ers a European citizen a potentially more promising route to 
family unifi cation than under Article 8 ECHR. 
In Ruiz Zambrano the Court recognised a right of residence of the family 
member of a European citizen by reason of the very nature of that status, thereby 
expanding the group of European citizens who may benefi t from family reunifi ca-
tion rights from those who have ‘moved’ to, in principle at least, all European 
citizens irrespective of cross-border movement. Invoking a citizenship right off ers 
strong and concrete rights and avoids the need to engage in the more nebulous 
acts of weighing and balancing that is required when coming to a human rights 
decision, inherently on a case by case basis. 
Reverse discrimination: an opportunity missed?
Th e Court in Ruiz Zambrano could equally have chosen to slice the Gordian knot 
of ‘reverse discrimination’, perceived by some to be a source of friction that inhib-
its the full and smooth absorption of European Union free movement rights into 
domestic systems.58 Reverse discrimination occurs when a ‘mobile’ EU citizen 
benefi ts from more favourable rules under European Union law than a ‘static’ EU 
citizen does in his own member state. For example, a European citizen who moves 
to another member state with a third country family member will benefi t from 
European Union free movement rules under the Citizens’ Rights Directive, which 
lay down the conditions under which third country national family members are 
54 C. Costello, ‘Metock: Free Movement and “Normal Family Life” in the Union’, 46 Common 
Market Law Review (2009) p. 587. 
55 ECJ, supra n. 40.
56 ECJ 11 Dec. 2007, Case C-291/05, Minister voor Vreemdelingenzaken en Integratie v. R.N.G. 
Eind.
57 A. Tryfonidou, ‘Family Reunifi cation Rights of (Migrant) Union Citizens: Towards a More 
Liberal Approach’, 15 European Law Journal (2009) p. 634. 
58 N. Nic Shuibhne, ‘Free Movement of Persons and the Wholly Internal Rule: Time to Move 
on?’, 29 Common Market Law Review (2002) p. 731.
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entitled to join European citizens in the host member state in the absence of the 
application of national immigration law at the point of entry into the Union. 
Settled case-law of the Court denies that European law need fi nd a remedy for 
the issue of reverse discrimination,59 and the Court has stated on a number of 
occasions that European citizenship is not intended to extend the reach of EU law 
to ‘internal situations’ that have no link to EU law.60 Th e Court does not explic-
itly retreat from this position in Ruiz Zambrano – it does not adopt Advocate-
General Sharpston’s three point test that could have off ered a measured solution 
to the reverse discrimination conundrum61 – and yet this nevertheless appears to 
be the remarkable outcome achieved by its decision.
Th e subsequent case of McCarthy appears to withdraw somewhat from the bold 
decision in Ruiz Zambrano. Th e decision in McCarthy that Union law does not 
require the grant of a residency permit to a static European citizen does not how-
ever necessarily limit the scope of Ruiz Zambrano as regards the issue of reverse 
discrimination. As Advocate-General Kokott points out: ‘Th e present case never-
theless does not appear to be the right context for detailed examination of the 
issue of discrimination against one’s own nationals.’62 Mrs McCarthy did not in 
fact face reverse discrimination because a mobile European citizen who similarly 
had never been economically active would not have met the criteria for permanent 
residence. Mrs McCarthy therefore does not suff er a disadvantage by reason of the 
fact that she has not exercised her right of free movement: had she done so, she 
still would have been ineligible for permanent residence. 
Th e decision of the Court is however neither as nimble nor as neat as neutral-
ising the reverse discrimination eff ect. Ruiz Zambrano mirrors for the parent care-
giver of a static European citizen child that right of residence established in Chen 
for the static European citizen child. Th e decision in Ruiz Zambrano however has 
in fact thrown Chen into relief, adding an extra right for the third country na-
tional parent: the right to receive a work permit. In Chen, the Court drew from 
the Citizens’ Rights Directive a requirement of self-suffi  ciency, yet in Ruiz Zam-
brano the Court requires the member state to provide the conditions for the fam-
ily to become self-suffi  cient by providing a work permit. One can appreciate why 
this may lead member states to refl ect upon the question: ‘who pays the cost of 
European citizenship?’ Th e answer appears to be that member states pay the cost, 
not as a result of political agreement but by swift decision of the Court. Th e right 
to work includes the right to access to social welfare in times of hardship or lack 
59 ECJ supra n. 40, at paras. 77-78.
60 ECJ 2 Oct. 2003, Case C-148/02, Carlos Garcia Avello v. Etat belge; ECJ 12 July 2005, Case 
C-403/03, Egon Schemmp v. Finanzamt Munchen V; ECJ 1 April 2008, Case C-212/06 Government 
of the French Community and Walloon Government v. Flemish Government. 
61 Sharpston, supra n. 2, paras. 139-150. 
62 Kokott, supra n. 30, para. 43.
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of work. With that fi nancial cost, member states must also bear a political cost 
and at a time of pressure on the labour market and in a political context where 
‘tough on immigration’ policies are fl avour of the moment, member states govern-
ments may not be keen to embrace a decision that off ers a failed asylum seeker 
access to their labour market.63 
Individual justice, collective uncertainty? 
Th e extension of residency rights under European citizenship to situations in which 
no frontiers have been crossed is unlikely to have been anticipated by even the 
most compliant and Euro-centric of member states. It is understandable why some 
may feel that the legitimacy of the Court is endangered by judicial activism, with 
unpredictable decisions extending the scope of European citizenship in a manner 
unforeseen and unsupported by member states. 
Th e decision in Ruiz Zambrano is so ambiguous that it may reasonably be 
questioned whether the Court in this instance has prioritised individual justice 
over legal certainty and the consistent application of settled principle. A desire of 
the Court to help the Ruiz Zambrano family would be understandable; they are 
a family who in the face of their non refoulement decision had tried for fourteen 
years to regularise their immigration status, who had integrated into Belgian so-
ciety, and who had contributed to the welfare system. And yet in relying upon 
European citizenship in ‘hard cases’ as an instrument of justice the Court raises 
much broader questions not only of the evolving nature of that status, but also of 
the systematic integrity of Union jurisdiction and the desirable limits of judicial 
activism.
Such unilateral development of Union citizenship rights by the Court would 
be less problematic if substantiated by thorough judicial analysis elaborating the 
reasoning underlying such a decision, thereby justifying its consequences and 
identifying the limitations of its application. Unfortunately in the absence of any 
such exposition we can neither hope to understand the basis of the decision in 
Ruiz Zambrano nor predict with any accuracy its likely consequences. Th e only 
conclusion that can be stated with any certainty is that Ruiz Zambrano will insti-
gate a wealth of litigation seeking to clarify many of those questions raised by the 
63 Despite two countries so far inviting cases to be reconsidered following the decision (Ireland 
and Denmark) it remains to be seen how other member states will respond to the decision in Ruiz 
Zambrano. Based on the unsatisfactory transposition of the Citizens Rights Directive, eff ective 
implementation of the decision may pose a challenge for member states (see European Commission, 
‘Report from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council on the application of 
Directive 2004/38/EC on the right of citizens to move and reside freely within the territory of the 
member states’, COM(2008)840/3, <www.ec.europa.eu/romania/documents/information/rap
ort_directiva_38-2004_en.pdf>, visited 29 April 2011. 
http://journals.cambridge.org Downloaded: 05 Aug 2013 IP address: 130.209.6.42
307ECJ: Case C-34/09, European Citizen Rights in Internal Situations
brief and opaque judgment, and in doing so will cause the limits of European 
citizenship to be further tested and refi ned over the coming years.

